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The History of the Informed Consent Requirement
in United States Federal Policy
I.
Introduction
The informed consent provision in United States federal policy serves a crucial function by protecting human
subjects participating in medical research experiments. This paper will trace the development of informed
consent as a legal doctrine. The paper will rst consider numerous landmark cases, including those that
established the basic consent requirement and those that extended the requirement to medical research.
In addition to case law, the major scholarly publications and social incidents that spurred the American
government to draft protective legislation will be examined. Finally, the paper will explore the numerous
eorts by US policymakers to arrive at acceptable legislation. After taking an in-depth look at both two
government agencies' attempts to adequately dene informed consent, the analysis will conclude with a
discussion of the current rule regarding informed consent in medical research.
1II. The Birth of the Legal Informed Consent Requirement
A. The Creation of the Basic Consent Requirement
The introduction of informed consent into American legal doctrine came gradually through the pronounce-
ment of a series of important court decisions. Although there were a few nineteenth-century cases implicating
consent, the truly signicant cases began to come before the courts in the early twentieth-century.1 Before
courts could deal with informed consent, however, they had to deal with basic consent cases. American
courts' rst forays into the consent arena arose in the context of battery cases. According to Ruth Faden,
\Four battery decisions between 1905 and 1914 are almost universally credited with formulating the basic
features of informed consent in American law."2 These cases were Mohr v. Williams, Pratt v. Davis, Rolater
v. Strain, Schloendor v. Society of New York Hospitals.
The rst two cases, Mohr and Pratt, can easily be evaluated together. Although they occurred in dierent
states, they went before the courts over roughly the same time period. The two courts also seemed to
inuence each other; even though Pratt went before the lower court later than Mohr, the nal Mohr ruling
wound up citing the Pratt lower court decision.3 More importantly, they came out the same way. They can
be seen to introduce in American courts the concept that a patient has the right to make her own decisions
about medical treatment and procedures performed on her body.4
1Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent 119 (1986). Hereinafter \Faden."
2Id. at 120.
3Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
4Faden at 120.
2Mohr v. Williams (1905) can be regarded as the rst signicant consent case. In that case, Mrs. Mohr
consented to an operation on her right ear, to remove diseased portions of her ear. She consented after
conferring with her family physician, who was also present during the operation. Once the plainti was
anesthetized, however, the defendant surgeon discovered that her right ear was not as sick as he had previously
thought, but that her left ear had serious problems. The surgeon felt that the plainti's left ear, and not
the right, should be operated on, so he performed the procedure on the left ear.5 Mrs. Mohr sued the
surgeon after the operation further impaired her hearing. She claimed that the operation, \not having been
consented to by her, was wrongful and unlawful, constituting an assault and battery."6
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the surgeon should have consulted with the patient and obtained
her consent before performing any surgery. A doctor cannot assume that a patient has consented to surgery
merely because the patient seeks the doctor's advice about treatment.7 The court, citing Pratt v. Davis,
stated:
Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's rst and greatest right, which
underlies all others|the right to the inviolability of his person; in other words, the
right to himself|is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily
forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or eminent, who has been asked to
examine, diagnose, advise, and prescribe (which are at least necessary rst steps in
treatment and care), to violate, without permission, the bodily integrity of his patient
by a major or capital operation, placing him under an anaesthetic for that purpose,
and operating upon him without his consent or knowledge.8
The court thus placed the utmost importance on the patients' right to decide about the course of treatment.
Battery liability was predicated on this right, which gave patients the freedom to protect their bodily integrity
from unwanted interference. In exercising this right, patients were entitled to know about the dangers and
risks of the procedure, as well as have a chance to evaluate them before coming to a decision.9
5Mohr, 104 N.W. at 13.
6Id. at 13.
7Id. at 15.
9Id.
3In reaching its decision, the court relied on a torts treatise to show that the consent requirement exists not
just to authorize a touching, but also to make sure that the patient makes an informed decision. The court
cites Kinkead on Torts, x 375, for the general rule:
The patient must be the nal arbiter as to whether he will take his chance with
the operation, or take his chances of living without it. Such is the natural right of
the individual, which the law recognizes as a legal one. Consent, therefore, of an
individual, must be either expressly or impliedly given before a surgeon may have the
right to operate.10
The court evaluates the logic of this principle by pointing out that all other trades and occupations involve
contracts, entered into by the mutual agreement of the interested parties, which specify exactly how activities
are to be performed. The concept of consent in the doctor-patient context can be viewed as the logical
application of the contract idea to the medical eld.11
The court did acknowledge, however, that there would be situations in which a doctor has implied consent
to perform a procedure. However, this implied consent would only arise in an emergency, such as if the
patient were unconscious or if her injuries were so serious as to require immediate attention, in order to
save his life. In addition, if during the course of an operation, a doctor were to discover previously-unknown
conditions that without redress would endanger the patient's life, the doctor would be entitled to perform
the additional procedure without consent.12 However, in this case, the court felt that operating on the other
ear did not fall into any of these exceptions, so the surgeon was perceived as operating without consent,
thereby committing battery.13
In Pratt v. Davis (1906), the Supreme Court of Illinois likewise underscored the importance of the consent
requirement. In this case, Mrs. Pratt sued a physician for battery after he performed a hysterectomy on her
11Id.
12Id. at 15; see also Faden, at 121.
13Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15.
4without rst obtaining her consent.14 The physician had gotten her consent for an earlier operation, but he
admitted that he had not even attempted to get consent for the second procedure. In fact, he acknowledged
that he had intentionally misled her and had taken chances of which she had been completely unaware.
The doctor claimed that because Mrs. Pratt was an epileptic, she was incompetent to give consent or to
deliberate intelligently about her situation.15
The court held the physician liable for operating without consent. As in Mohr, the court cited certain
emergency cases in which implied consent could be inferred. However, the general rule required consent.16
Rejecting the contention that Mrs. Pratt was incapable of giving consent simply because she was an epileptic,
the court wrote, \Ordinarily, where the patient is in full possession of all his mental faculties and in such
physical health as to be able to consult about his condition without the consultation itself being fraught
with dangerous consequences to the patient's health, and when no emergency exists making it impracticable
to confer with him, it is manifest that his consent should be a prerequisite to a surgical operation."17
The third important case, Rolater v. Strain, extended the reasoning earlier prescribed in Mohr and Pratt to
other factual situations. In Rolater, a woman sued her physician after he removed a bone from her foot during
an operation, to which she had consented, to drain an infection.18 The woman claimed that the doctor had
violated her order that he not remove any bones from her foot, so that the removal constituted a trespass
to her person, as well as an assault and battery. The doctor argued that Mohr and Pratt were inapplicable
to this case because he had in fact obtained the patient's consent to foot surgery, and he had performed the
surgery on the proper foot.19 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, however, held that the principles of the
earlier cases were indeed applicable because the doctor had not carried out the operation in the manner that
14Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
15Id. at 564.
16Id.
17Id. at 564.
18Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96, 97 (1913).
19Id.
5the patient had specied.20 Rolater highlighted the extent of a patient's self-determination by stressing that
the patient could give carefully constrained consent, thereby dictating precisely what the doctor could do,
even if the procedure was within the doctor's eld and the doctor felt that such procedure was necessary.21
The nal important early case in the area of consent is Schloendor v. Society of New York Hospitals
(1914).22 In this case, the patient had consented to an ether examination of a broid tumor but notied
the doctor that she wanted no operation. Once the patient was unconscious from the ether, the tumor was
removed, and the patient later developed gangrene in her left arm, which required amputation of several
ngers.23 The patient sued the hospital for torts committed by surgeons using the hospital facilities, rather
than the actual surgeon who performed the procedure. Because she sued the hospital, the Court of Appeals
of New York held that there was no violation of informed consent.24
Despite the fact that the court found for the hospital, Schloendor remains a crucial case in the history
of informed consent. Writing for the court, Justice Cardozo armed a patient's right of self-determination
when he wrote:
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely negligence. It is trespass.
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages. This is
true, except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious, and where it is
necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.25
This statement underscored that patients have the right to protect their bodily integrity by making their
own decisions about their medical treatment. Furthermore, a doctor's interference with this right may be
considered a battery.
20Id. at 98.
21Faden at 123.
22Id.
23Schloendor v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
24Faden at 123.
6B. The Introduction of Informed Consent
After Schloendor, courts throughout the country continued to hear battery cases, judging them based on
the duty to obtain consent and the self-determination principle introduced in these four early cases.26 The
next major court case dealing with consent did not come for several decades, until Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. University Board of Trustees in 1957. The Salgo case marked the introduction of the term \informed
consent" and a new legal duty.27
In Salgo, Mr. Salgo brought a malpractice suit against his physicians alleging negligence when he became
permanently paralyzed after having undergone a translumbar aortography. Mr. Salgo's doctor had rec-
ommended the surgery, but Mr. Salgo claimed that the doctor had never explained the various possible
complications of the suggested procedures or warned him about the risk of potential paralysis.28 A Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals decided that the physician was liable for not disclosing relevant information to the
patient.29
Although the consent issue in the case was not the main grounds for appeal, the court nonetheless set an
important precedent when it created a heightened duty to disclose on the part of doctors.30 The court
determined that \a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds
any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment."31 This new type of consent focused on whether the doctor had provided the patient with all the
26Faden at 125.
27Jay Katz, Informed Consent|A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 137, 149 (1977).
Hereinafter \Katz, Law's Vision."
28Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 173 (1957).
29Id. at 181.
30Jay Katz, Informed Consent|Must It Remain A Fairy Tale?, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 69, 72 (1993). Here-
inafter \Katz, Remain a Fairy Tale?." See also Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation,
19 J. Legal Med. 157, 161 (1998). Hereinafter \Morin."
31Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
7information needed to make an intelligent decision, such information including the harms, benets, risks and
alternatives of the proposed procedure. Such disclosure went much beyond the disclosure that was required
to defeat a battery claim, which simply involved information about the nature of the procedure.32
In addition to imposing a disclosure requirement, however, the court also placed some limits on this new
requirement by subjecting it to physicians' discretion. The court seemed to recognize the need for a thera-
peutic exception, exercisable at a physician's discretion. Under this exception, a doctor could either explain
every risk to a patient, potentially frightening the patient out of treatment, or use some discretion to reveal
only those facts that are needed to obtain valid informed consent.33 This allowance for discretion, however,
seemed to contradict the idea of maximum disclosure by physicians, leaving the new requirement broad and
undened.
Despite the breakthrough introduction of informed consent, courts remained unclear about how to actually
apply the new rule.34 According to scholar Jay Katz, this opportunity for discretion created a judicial
dilemma that has continued to plague the doctrine of informed consent. Reecting on the history of informed
consent, Katz wrote:
The conict created by uncertainties about the extent to which individual and societal
well-being is better served by encouraging patients' self-determination or supporting
physicians' paternalism is the central problem of informed consent. This fundamental
conict, reecting a thoroughgoing ambivalence about human beings' capacities for
taking care of themselves and need for care-taking, has shaped judicial pronounce-
ments on informed consent more decisively than is commonly appreciated. The as-
sertion of a `need' for physicians' discretion|-for a professional expert's rather than
a patient's judgment as to what constitutes well-being|-reveals this ambivalence.35
Regardless of the confusion Salgo caused, however, Katz suggests that the court had at least highlighted the
32Katz, Law's Vision at 150.
33Morin at 157.
34Katz, Law's Vision at 150.
8necessity of adequate disclosure by doctors, paving the way for further development of the informed consent
requirement.36
While Salgo introduced the duty of informed consent, Natanson v. Kline (1960) marked the rst time that
physician liability was rooted in the negligence theory, rather than battery.37 In this case, Mrs. Natanson,
suering from breast cancer, had a mastectomy and then endured cobalt therapy to the mastectomy site to
reduce the chance that the cancer would recur or spread. After she was injured from the cobalt radiation
therapy, she sued her radiologist for negligence both in the performance of the procedure and in failing
to warn her about the nature and hazards of the treatment.38 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the
radiologist was liable for failing to meet his duty of disclosure. The court outlined the duty of disclosure as
\the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary the
nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives,
and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body."39
Like all the earlier cases, the court justied this duty by pointing to the importance of patient self-
determination. The court writes:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or
other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of
treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his
own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artice or deception.40
However, as in Salgo, the court faced some confusion as to how to implement this self-determination prin-
ciple in the law.41 On the one hand, since this was a negligence claim, the standard of care imposed on
36Id. at 149.
37Faden at 129. See also Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory
Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 63, 76 (1993). Hereinafter \Goldner."
38Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1960).
39Id. at 1107.
41Katz, Law's Vision at 151.
9the defendant doctor was that of a reasonable and prudent medical doctor in the same school of practice,
working under similar circumstances. On the other hand, because the court was trying to honor the principle
of self-determination, it specied that the defendant doctor had to make a reasonable disclosure about the
nature and probable consequences of the proposed treatment, as well as the possible dangers he knew about.
The problem was that this second standard encompassed much more than the rst standard, that of the
\reasonable and prudent medical doctor" would.42
Forced to choose a standard, the court decided to treat this case in negligence. It determined that the
standard was that of a reasonable doctor: \the duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to
those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circum-
stances."43 Further separating this case from a battery claim, it also mandated a causation requirement,
showing that the doctor's failure to make reasonable disclosure was indeed a proximate cause of the injury.44
Therefore, \the court rmly cemented liability for failure to disclose necessary information in the law of
negligent malpractice by recognizing its traditional requirements: violation of a professional standard of care
and proximate cause."45 The Natanson court thus rmly established that the negligence theory applied to
informed consent cases.
42Id. at 152.
43Natanson, 350 P.2d. at 1106.
44Faden at 131.
45Katz, Law's Vision at 152-3.
10C.
Further Exploration of the Informed Consent Requirement
Natanson's reasonable doctor/professional practice standard of disclosure proved quite important when it
became the standard that was adopted in most states.46 However, in 1972, Canterbury v. Spence changed
the disclosure standard to that of the reasonable person, while arming that a doctor does indeed bear the
duty of due care and must warn a patient of any risks so that the patient may make an intelligent decision
about treatment.47 The case involved a young man who underwent a laminectomy for back pain, without
being told about the risk of paralysis. One day after the operation, Mr. Canterbury fell from his hospital
bed; several hours later, the lower half of his body was paralyzed. After a second operation failed to correct
the paralysis, he sued, alleging that the doctor negligently failed to disclose the risk of paralysis before the
rst operation.48
The Canterbury court, held that the doctor was liable for failure to disclose the risk.49 The DC Court of
Appeals, building on the tradition established in Schloendor and the other early cases, based its decision
around the patient's right to self-determination. The attainment of self-determination required a heightened
disclosure duty:
True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each. The average patient has little or no understanding of
the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for
enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From these almost ax-
iomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a reasonable
divulgence by physician to patient to make such a decision possible.50
46Morin at 2.
47Faden at 132. See also Judith Areen et al., Law , Science and Medicine 372-82 (1984). Hereinafter \Areen."
48Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
49Id. at 781.
11In order for the patient to make an intelligent decision, the doctor had to provide reasonable disclosure of the
risks of and alternatives to the treatment. The physician-patient relationship provided the link of why the
doctor had to aord such disclosure; the patient trusted and relied on the doctor to reveal any information
that would be important for the patient to know.51
In addition to the self-determination argument, however, the court also incorporated a physician due care
argument. The doctor bears a duty to treat the patient with reasonable skill and due care; this duty includes
an obligation to disclose certain relevant information, such as side eects of medication and advice about the
consultation of specialists as needed.52 Signicantly, \due care normally demands that the physician warn
the patient of any risks to his well-being which contemplated therapy may involve."53 Since the process of
obtaining informed consent would be worthless if the physician had not rst explained the risks clearly to
the patient, the physician must make adequate disclosure to each patient.54
While the Canterbury court armed the disclosure requirement, however, it departed from prior cases by
adopting the reasonable person standard in place of the professional practice standard.55 The court felt that
\to bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician
alone. Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by
law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves."56
The court rejected the subjective standard, choosing to focus on the reasonable person. The extent of dis-
closure therefore had to be measured according to what would be important to the average patient, instead
of what the average doctor revealed in usual practice.57 The court's reliance on the reasonable person stan-
51Id. at 782.
52Faden at 134.
53Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781.
54Faden at 134.
55Id. at 132.
56Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784.
57Id.
12dard seemed to reect a greater concern for adequately fullling patients' rights, while still limiting doctors'
liability from individual patients' subjective claims. The Canterbury case ultimately combined elements of
both the battery and negligence cases, while addressing the importance of patients' self-determination and
the realities of the doctor-patient relationship.
III.
The Consent Requirement Applied to Medical Research
A. Important Cases
All the battery and negligence cases discussed thus far, from Mohr through Canterbury, dealt with consent
in the medical treatment setting. In several other important cases, however, American courts also addressed
the consent requirement as applied to medical research. The earliest signicant American case was Carpenter
v. Blake (1871), in which the patient sued her physician for negligence and malpractice in the setting and
treatment of a dislocated limb.58 The patient alleged that the doctor did not properly set the dislocated arm,
and also that the doctor did not attempt to reset the bones after the patient developed an obvious swelling
at the elbow joint. The physician defended his actions by claiming that his unusual treatment method was
not negligence but rather a new type of treatment; he did not claim to be engaging in research, but organized
research had not yet become a common practice.59
58Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. N.Y. 488 (1871).
59Faden at 190.
13The Carpenter court held that a doctor who departs from the usual, established method of treatment is
liable for any resulting problems. According to the court, \the rule protects the community against reckless
experiments, while it admits the adoption of new remedies and modes of treatment only when their benets
have been demonstrated."60 This rule treated experimentation as a negligent departure from traditional
practice and accepted the validity of new remedies and treatments only after their benets had already been
proven, making experimentation a dangerous pursuit for doctors.61
The Carpenter rule dominated the American medical world's approach to experimentation for many years.
In 1934, however, the Supreme Court of Colorado initiated a slightly more tolerant attitude regarding
experimentation.62 In Brown v. Hughes, Mr. Hughes' widow sued a dentist and a physician after they
removed her husband's tonsils and sixteen of his teeth without his consent and against his will; Mr. Hughes
died soon afterward. The widow alleged that the doctors' negligence and malpractice caused her husband's
death.63 The court did not nd the defendants liable and opened the door to allow some experimentation
by doctors. The court determined that some experimentation had to be allowed or else science would never
advance: \there must be a clearer case of total abandon than here attaches before liability occurs, otherwise
the learned judgment of our skilled profession would be lost to the human race. Without such, we could not
enjoy the advancement of science."64
The most important case in the eld of experimentation came the following year, when the Michigan Supreme
60Carpenter, 60 Barb. N.Y. at 521.
61Goldner at 72. See also Henry K. Beecher, Research and the Individual 37 (1970). Hereinafter \Beecher, Individ-
ual."
62Faden at 190.
63Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
64Id. at 263.
14Court acknowledged that medical progress required some research involving human subjects.65 In Fortner
v. Koch (1935), Mr. Fortner, though actually suering from syphilis, was treated for sarcoma. He sued the
physician, alleging negligence in his diagnosis and treatment; he claimed that the physician did not use the
various diagnostic methods available, including taking x-rays or microscopically examining tissue specimens
from the infected area. The court held the doctor liable for his negligence.66
In a crucial step, however, the court for the rst time allowed that some human experimentation must be
permitted, writing: \we recognize the fact that, if the general practice of medicine and surgery is to progress,
there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried on; but such experiments must be done with the
knowledge and consent of the patient or those responsible for him, and must not vary too radically from the
accepted method of procedure."67 Therapeutic research, allowing experiments that could potentially benet
the patient, was the type of experimentation protected by this decision. The court imposed two important
limits on such experimentation, namely that the subject consent and that the procedure not deviate too much
from established practice.68 These considerations of valid consent and an acceptable risk-benet analysis
would later become the two main concerns in the debate about whether research on human subjects should
be justied.69 The importance of the Fortner case thus stems from both its unprecedented tolerance towards
and justications for experimentation on humans.
65Morin at 169.
66Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
67Id. at 765.
68Goldner at 73.
69Faden at 191.
15B. Promulgation of Signicant Early Codes
Despite the Fortner court's acknowledgment of the importance of research on human subjects, such research
did not actually become widespread in the United States until the mid-twentieth century, shortly before the
beginning of World War II.70 Internationally, however, research on humans was a common occurrence, and
it was a reaction to experiments conducted by Nazi physicians during World War II that prompted the rst
attempt by any group to regulate research.71
The focus on informed consent in research \grew gradually after the occurrence of what is still today the
most important watershed event: the unprecedented cruelties and generally inferior science, administered by
what were often well-trained physicians of prominence, during the Nazi reign in Germany."72 Nazi scientists
and doctors widely engaged in racial hygiene, in an eort to control reproduction in society and achieve
racial cleansing. They followed three main programs: the Sterilization Law, the Nuremberg Laws, and the
euthanasia operation. These three practices allowed doctors to determine which citizens would survive,
marry, and reproduce.73
In 1946, the Nazi physicians were tried before the Nuremberg military tribunal for the biomedical experiments
they conducted during World War II.74 The twenty-three defendants in United States v. Karl Brandt were
doctors and administrators, many of whom were high-ranking in the Third Reich's medical hierarchy. The
defendants were charged with conducting human experimentation on unconsenting prisoners and performing
such \medical" experiments as injecting prisoners with infectious diseases, mutilating bones and muscles, and
forcing prisoners to ingest poisons.75 Their subjects included Jews, gypsies, Poles and Russians imprisoned
70Id. at 151.
71Thomas John Babbo, Begging the Questions: Fetal Tissue Research, The Protection of Human Subjects, and the Banality
of Evil, 3 DePaul J. Health Care L. 383, 387 (2000). Hereinafter \Babbo."
72Faden at 153.
73George J. Annas and Michael A. Grodin, The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human
Experimentation 17-24 (1992). Hereinafter \Annas, Nazi Doctors."
74Babbo at 387.
75Annas, Nazi Doctors at 132.
16in the concentration camps.76 In the trial's opening statement, the prosecutor stated:
The defendants in this case are charged with murders, tortures, and other atrocities
committed in the name of medical science...All of them have in common a callous
lack of consideration and human regard for, and an unprincipled willingness to abuse
their power over the poor, unfortunate, defenseless creatures who had been deprived
of their rights by a ruthless and criminal government. All of them violated the
Hippocratic commandments which they had solemnly sworn to uphold and abide by,
including the fundamental principles never to do harm|\primum non nocere."77
Witnesses in the trial testied that the experiments had no valid medical justication and simply exposed
the subjects to extreme cruelty.78
The judges at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal condemned the defendants' behavior. They found that Nazi
doctors had violated their subjects' rights and ignored their ethics as doctors. They also established the
\certain basic principles [that] must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts" while
conducting research on human subjects.79 These ten principles became the Nuremberg Code, promulgated
in 1948. The Nuremberg Code focused on protecting the human subject by requiring the subject's consent
and setting boundaries within which the investigator may conduct research.80
Principle One states that \the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."81 Such
consent must have at least four characteristics; it must be voluntary, competent, informed, and comprehend-
ing.82 Although all ten brief principles were signicant, a brief examination of several other principles reveals
how the drafters tried to protect subjects by imposing limits on how investigators could perform their exper-
iments and convince subjects to participate. Principle Four directs physicians to conduct experiments so as
76Faden at 153.
78Faden at 154.
79Judgment in United States v. Karl Brandt, reprinted in Katz, Experimentation at 305.
80Annas, Nazi Doctors at 152. See also Kenneth L. Vaux and Stanley G. Schade, The Search for Universality in the Ethics
of Human Research: Andrew C. Ivy, Henry K. Beecher, and the Legacy of Nuremberg, in The Use of Human Beings in
Research 3-16 (Stuart F. Spicker et al eds, 1988).
81Nuremberg Code, reprinted in Annas, Nazi Doctors at 2.
82Id.
17to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suering and injury. Principle Seven commands investigators
to make the appropriate preparations to protect subjects against any chance of injury or death. Finally,
Principle Nine grants subjects the right to terminate the experiment at any time.83 The promulgation of
the Nuremberg Code was a monumental rst step in the eort to regulate research on humans and would
soon inuence many professional organizations and governments who were beginning to contemplate similar
regulation.
The Declaration of Helsinki was the rst major code produced after the Nuremberg Code appeared. After
the atrocities committed by the Nazis attracted signicant attention, the medical community realized that it
needed to issue better regulation surrounding clinical research.84 As a result, the World Medical Association
(WMA) drafted the Declaration of Helsinki, which was adopted in 1964 by the 18th World Medical Assem-
bly.85 While the Nuremberg Code was seen as the courts' imposing strict legal obligations on doctors, the
Declaration garnered praise as a non-legal code promulgated internally by the medical community, oering
standards meant simply to guide doctors.86
As the Nuremberg Code had, the Declaration focused on the need for consent while conducting research.
However, \by order of priority, the Declaration of Helsinki placed scientic expertise and the goals of medicine
before the informed consent of the research subject."87 The Declaration operated primarily by distinguishing
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.88 Non-therapeutic research, which was dened as purely
scientic studies without therapeutic value for the subject, could not be performed without consent.89 Prin-
ciple One, section nine reads: \In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benets and potential hazards of the study and the discomfort
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18it may entail...The physician should then obtain the subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in
writing."90
On the other hand, therapeutic research, dened as medical research combined with professional care, did
not require informed consent by the subject. Rather, the physician was free to pursue new measures in his
own judgment, subject to only a modest check on his judgment in the form of review by an independent
review committee.91 It should be noted that the Declaration, which did not involve an American group
and was not legally binding, probably did not signicantly alter research practices in the United States.92
Nonetheless, the Declaration of Helsinki became an inuential document in the history of informed consent
after many American medical groups endorsed it and the federal government turned to it as guidance while
developing its own rules.93
C. Inuential Scholarly Publications
While the Declaration of Helsinki marks the medical community's response to the Nazi doctors' barbarisms,
the publications of several important scholarly works demonstrate the reactions of various scholars. Henry
K. Beecher could arguably be cited as the most inuential scholar to comment on the deciencies of research
ethics.94 In several inuential works, Beecher, a physician at Harvard, called for stricter protection of re-
search subjects. His earliest oering, Experimentation in Man, which appeared in 1959, argued that the
activities in Germany and the continued growth in human experimentation \indicate the need for a long,
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19straight look at our current practices."95 While Beecher acknowledged the need for human experimentation,
he believed that the subjects' consent had to be obtained prior to research.96
Beecher's goal in Experimentation intended to call attention to the moral problems associated with research
on humans and to demand that the medical community adopt practices that complied with moral require-
ments.97 He did not actually propose a new system to follow, since he did not believe in codes and rules
delineating adherence to specic rules. According to Beecher, rules \are more likely to do harm than good.
Rules are not going to curb the unscrupulous. Such abuses as have occurred are usually due to ignorance
and inexperience. The most eective protection for all concerned depends upon a recognition and an under-
standing of the various aspects of the problem."98
In 1966, Beecher produced two other crucial works that helped draw attention to the ethical violations that
routinely occurred in human research. In \Ethics and Clinical Research," published in the New England
Journal of Medicine, Beecher discussed twenty-two examples of questionable experiments and stated that of
the fty cases he originally compiled, the subjects' consent had been obtained in only two cases.99 He wrote,
\Evidence is at hand that many of the patients in the examples to follow never had the risk satisfactorily
explained to them, and it seems obvious that further hundreds have not known that they were the subjects
of an experiment although grave consequences have been suered as a direct result of experiments described
here."100 Beecher argued that unethical or questionably ethical practices occurred with signicant frequency,
producing a serious situation that had to be addressed.101
That same year, Beecher wrote an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association, in which he
95Henry K. Beecher, Experimentation in Man, in Clinical Investigation in Medicine 2-39 (Irving Ladimer & Roger W.
Newman eds., 1963). Hereinafter \Beecher, Experimentation."
96Id.
97Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 234 (1979).
98Beecher, Experimentation at 27.
99McNeill at 60.
100Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 New Eng. J. Med. 1354 (1966).
101Id. See also George Annas, The Rights of Patients 146 (1992). Hereinafter \Annas, Rights."
20again argued that codes were not the best way to ensure that the requirement of informed consent is met.102
Rather, he appealed to the virtue of physicians, stating that the patient's \great safeguard in experimen-
tation as in therapy is the presence of the skillful, informed, intelligent, honest, responsible, compassionate
physician."103 Even though Beecher did not support the promulgation of an American code, his writings
ultimately greatly inuenced the development of American federal policy regarding informed consent in re-
search.
Another instrumental scholar was M.H. Pappworth, an Englishman who himself inuenced Beecher.104 In
1967, Pappworth published Human Guinea Pigs, in which he revealed his ndings about more than 500
cases of unethical experiments. He highlighted experiments performed on numerous types of people, includ-
ing children, the mentally ill, and dying patients who either were incapable or had diculty giving consent.
Pappworth noted that many physicians took unreasonable risks with their patients' lives and were generally
unconcerned with their patients' overall well-being.105 He therefore demanded that new legislative proce-
dures be developed to safeguard patients' rights.106
The nal scholar to contribute important work in this eld was psychiatrist Jay Katz, who published the
anthology Experimentation with Human Beings in 1972.107 Katz collected writings relating to the ethics
of human experimentation from a variety of elds, including law, medicine, biology, sociology, and psychol-
ogy. He gathered trial transcripts, panel discussions, editorial comments, legislation, and newspaper stories,
among other materials, to address the crucial questions of what limits should be placed on scientic inquiry,
and who should have the authority to impose those limits.108 According to Katz:
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21The real need to which this volume speaks is for greater conscious awareness and
relentless scholarly analysis of the conicting purposes of human experimentation|
protecting man, advancing science, and improving the well-being of society and future
generations. Only if students and decisionmakers are prepared to sort out these
conicts and to acknowledge the reality of harm to individuals and society can they
begin to formulate rules and procedures which will minimize harm without erecting
insuperable impediments to the acquisition of knowledge.109
Katz' anthology aimed, and largely succeeded, at stimulating discussion about the importance of conducting
scientic studies while still protecting subjects' rights.
D. Signicant Cases Involving Consent Violations
At the same time as scholars such as Beecher and Katz began voicing their concerns about experiments
conducted without subjects' consent, a number of cases and studies showcasing consent violations attracted
public attention. The earliest signicant episode involved a cancer study undertaken in 1963 at the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital (JCDH) in Brooklyn, New York.110 Three doctors at the Hospital injected live
cancer cells into twenty-two chronically ill and debilitated patients. The doctors had obtained the permission
of the hospital medical director, but they did not obtain consent from any of the patients involved, even
though the research was completely non-therapeutic. Some patients were informed that they were involved
in an experiment, but none were told that they were receiving cancer cells. Likewise, none of the patients
were notied that the test was unrelated to their usual therapeutic treatment.111
Many of JCDH's other doctors expressed concern about this cancer study. As a result, William Hyman, a
member of the hospital's board of directors, led suit to force the hospital to disclose its records. Hyman, an
attorney, was concerned about both the abuse of the patients and the hospital's potential liability for having
given experimental injections without consent.112 Disclosure ultimately revealed that the investigators had
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22not presented the study to the hospital research committee and that the subjects' attending doctors had not
been consulted before their patients received the injections.113
Hyman's suit helped bring attention to the cancer study, and in 1966 the Board of Regents of the University
of the State of New York brought suit against two of the doctors involved; these two doctors were found guilty
of fraud, deceit, and unprofessional conduct.114 The Board of Regents' Discipline Committee determined:
A patient has the right to know he is being asked to volunteer and to refuse to
participate in an experiment for any reason, intelligent or otherwise, well-informed
or prejudiced. A physician has no right to withhold from a prospective volunteer
any fact which he knows may inuence the decision...There is evidenced in the
record in this proceeding an attitude on the part of some physicians that they can
go ahead and do anything which they conclude is good for the patient, or which is of
benet experimentally or educationally and is not harmful to the patient, and that
the patient's consent is an empty formality. With this we cannot agree.115
The Board of Regents thus placed great importance on obtaining subjects' informed consent, regardless of the
degree of harm or possible therapeutic benets to the subject.116 Although the two doctors involved received
minimal punishment, namely one year probation, the case showcased the potential abuses of human subjects
and the inadequacy of current federal guidelines.117 The JCDH case would soon aect the development of
federal policy regarding human experimentation.
Several years later, a longer, more egregious study captured the nation's attention. Since the early 1930s, the
United States Public Health Service (PHS) had been conducting a study on the eects of untreated syphilis
on black men in Alabama.118 The purpose of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment was simply to compile data
about the progression of syphilis in black males. The study had no therapeutic value for the subjects, and
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23in fact men with syphilis were actively prevented from receiving the known treatment until the horrors of
the study had been exposed.119
The PHS doctors shockingly failed to obtain consent or inform their subjects about the circumstances of
the study. The subjects were not told the name of their disease or that they were participating in a non-
therapeutic experiment. They were told only that they were being treated for \bad blood," a term which
was never dened for them.120 In addition, they were informed that certain painful research procedures,
such as spinal taps, were \special free treatments," which was a clear lie on the doctors' parts. In sum,
the doctors clearly manipulated the subjects, relying on the fact that the subjects would trust the doctors'
statements and opinions.121
The study continued unaltered until 1972, when the reporter Jean Heller published a prole of the situation
on the rst page of the New York Times.122 With public attention focused on the Tuskegee Experiment, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare appointed an advisory panel to examine the problem and
address the issue of protecting human subjects.123 The panel ruled that the Tuskegee Experiment should
be discontinued and that subjects requiring care be given the proper treatment. The panel judged that
the study was \ethically unjustied in 1932...One fundamental ethical rule is that a person should not be
subjected to avoidable risk of death or physical harm unless he freely and intelligently consents. There is no
evidence that such consent was obtained from the participants in this study."124
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24More broadly, the panel determined that no American government agency had a uniform policy for reviewing
experimental procedures or obtaining subjects' consent. Instead, the investigators in the biomedical profes-
sion who were conducting the experiments were the ones who regulated research practices.125 The panel
decried the current situation and \oered procedural and substantive recommendations for safeguarding
subjects, the most important of which was the creation by Congress of a permanent body to regulate all
federally sponsored research on human subjects."126 In fact, by the early 1970s, the US government had be-
gun to mobilize eorts to draft a federal policy regulating human experimentation.127 The Tuskegee Syphilis
Experiment served as one other strong reminder that the policy needed to be nalized and implemented as
soon as possible to prevent further abuse of human subjects.
IV. Development of Federal Policies Concerning Human Research
A.
Initial Attempt at Regulation
The United States government did not really begin to formulate policies protecting human research subjects
until the 1960s.128 Although courts and international organizations had earlier recognized the importance
of explicitly oering such protection, US federal policies were slower to develop. When concern did arise,
however, two agencies within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) responded.129
Both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) eventually
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25reacted to the problem of unregulated research and proposed their own solutions. The two agencies had
dierent purposes, with the FDA responsible for regulation and the NIH in charge of funding and conducting
biomedical and behavioral research.130 Nonetheless, both agencies' concern about the lack of informed
consent in medical research shaped the development of the ultimate US policy.
The rst federal policy regarding research on human subjects emerged at the Clinical Center of the NIH. The
Clinical Center at Bethesda, which opened in 1953, was a research hospital that conducted clinical research
for the NIH.131 The Center commands attention because it had a strict internal code that dictated specic
points needed to obtain the subject's informed consent.132 Research subjects were treated as members of the
research team, showcasing \one of the earliest expressions of the concept of medical research as encompassing
the subjects as well as the investigators as colleagues in a cooperative enterprise."133 The Clinical Center's
landmark principles represent the rst established policy regarding the treatment of research subjects in a
US government health-care facility.134
Ocials at the Clinical Center hoped that their policy of detailed instructions for obtaining informed consent
would be adopted by other government agencies. Unfortunately, however, other agencies did not follow suit,
as the results of the Law-Medicine Institute Study of 1960 revealed.135 Boston University's Law-Medicine
Research Institute conducted a three-year study, looking at actual clinical research practice in the US. The
study showed that very few (nine out of fty-two) medical departments had any formal guidelines regarding
clinical research; even worse, only two of those nine had guidelines that were generally applicable to all clinical
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26research.136 Most of the investigators polled expressed dislike for self-regulation by committees, preferring
instead to leave all oversight directly to the investigators.137 It appears that despite the atrocities overseas
and the increasing regulations by international organizations, American investigators still felt little need to
protect human subjects. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, it seems that US federal policymakers were
willing to allow investigators the latitude they wanted.
B. FDA Reaction and Policy Established
In the early 1960s, however, the attitude of policymakers at the FDA changed with the promulgation of
the Drug Amendments of 1962. The Drug Amendments of 1962, formally the Kefauver-Harris Bill, made
important changes in the central laws governing the ethical drug industry.138 The most signicant changes
included the requirements that drug advertising be more carefully controlled; that drug labeling fully disclose
precautions and harmful side eects; that there be proof of therapeutic ecacy for drugs; and that the FDA
establish complete regulations for clinical testing of new drugs.139
The bill emerged largely after Congressional concern about the use and control of drugs. Although hearings
before Senator Estes Kefauver's Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly had focused mostly on price reg-
ulation and drug costs, the bill gained extra support after the Thalidomide problem in Europe demonstrated
the dangerous side eects of drugs.140 The fact that Thalidomide proved to cause serious side eects in
fetuses highlighted the necessity for more stringent drug testing and warning requirements.141 The drug
testing situation spurred Senator Jacob Javits to add a consent requirement, marking the rst time such a
requirement was included in US legislation.142
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27Introduced by amendment on the oor, the provision required that investigators both inform subjects if a
drug was experimental and obtain the subject's consent before beginning the study. However, the investi-
gators would not have to obtain consent if they felt it were unfeasible or if obtaining consent was, in their
professional judgment, contrary to the subject's best interests.143 Javits' argument that \the job of the
Senate was to `weigh in the balance' the obligations to obtain consent and to support experimentation"
helped bring the rst consent requirement into American law.144
When Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962, the FDA promulgated new regulations regarding the
new provisions. The regulations, eective in February 1963, addressed mainly research design and proce-
dures. However, they did not tackle the consent provisions, which were still broad and vaguely worded.145
The consent provision went largely ignored, perhaps because the FDA sta was busy enforcing other pro-
visions of the bill or because there had been no legislative debate about the meaning of the terms to help
guide the FDA.146 One of the few FDA administrators to speak out about the consent requirement was
Dr. Frances Kelsey, Chief of the Investigational Drug Branch, Division of New Drugs. In a paper published
by the Law-Medicine Research Institute, Kelsey argued that the best-interests exception could be validly
invoked in only a few isolated cases, such as dealing with children or in emergency cases; Kelsey's argument
would have signicantly limited the exception and crafted a much tighter consent requirement.147
The FDA nally took action regarding the patient consent provision in August 1966, with the publication
of the Statement of Policy Concerning Consent for Use of Investigational New Drugs on Humans.148 The
FDA's move to action was the result of two important events, namely a change in administration and a
growing realization, in part spurred by the controversy of the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case, that
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28many investigators were failing to obtain valid consent.149
The statement relied heavily on the general guidelines of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki.
Some of the language from these codes was adopted almost verbatim, particularly the denition of consent
from the Nuremberg Code.150 The FDA also adopted the Declaration's distinction between therapeutic and
non-therapeutic research, demanding patient's consent for therapeutic purposes, unless the patient could not
communicate.151 Finally, the FDA required that subjects give written consent and receive a fair explanation
of all material information.152 The statement reects an important move by the FDA to conform the policy
of the US to that proposed by international organizations. FDA administrators seemed to acknowledge the
danger of placing too much liberty in investigators' hands and moved to curtail the freedom that investigators
could take with subjects.
C. NIH Policy Developed
Unfortunately, however, the FDA regulations applied only to experimental drugs and devices, but not to
all research.153 In the early-1960s, Director of NIH James Shannon became increasingly concerned about
the lack of federal policy governing human research. Shannon's motivation came from the public anger
surrounding the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case, as well as the results from the 1960 Law-Medicine
Institute Study.154 Shannon commissioned a study scrutinizing research protocols.
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29The resulting report, submitted by Dr. Robert Livingston in November 1964, discussed the dearth of an
acceptable code to govern research and focused on the dangers of risk and liability surrounding research per-
formed without consent.155 However, Livingston concluded that the NIH could not regulate research ethics
without overstepping its bounds and intruding on investigators' authority.156 Livingston's conclusion seems
to represent an unfortunate step backward for American policy formulation. Although he acknowledged the
lack of adequate regulations, he ultimately gave priority to investigators' judgment, rather than individuals'
protection.
Shannon accepted Livingston's conclusion, but nonetheless opted to press forward to address the other rec-
ommendations in the report, such as review by investigators' peers and broad consultation with doctors,
lawyers and clergy regarding the ethics of clinical investigation.157 Shannon thus met with the National
Advisory Health Council (NAHC) in September 1965, in an eort to convince NAHC to establish formal
controls on investigators' independent judgment.158 NAHC saw the importance of regulating research on
humans and adopted a resolution to address the moral and ethical issues of clinical research:
Be it resolved that the National Advisory Health Council believes that Public Health
Service support of clinical research and investigation involving human beings should
be provided only if the judgment of the investigator is subject to prior review by his
institutional associates to assure an independent determination of the protection of
the rights and welfare of the individual or individuals involved, of the appropriateness
of the methods used to secure informed consent, and of the risks and potential medical
benets of the investigation.159
With this statement, the NAHC acknowledged the signicance of obtaining informed consent; however, it
made no mention of the denition of informed consent.160 These recommendations reect a willingness by
American policymakers to reach out across disciplines and take a rm stand to protect individual research
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30subjects.
NAHC's resolution soon led to a watershed event in the history of informed consent in the United States: the
publication in February 1966 of the Statement of Policy on Clinical Investigations Using Human Subjects.
The statement, issued by Surgeon General William Stewart, for the rst time required institutions receiving
research grants to obtain prior committee review for proposed research, rather than relying simply on the
judgment of the individual investigator.161 The independent review should include consideration of three
key elements: the rights and welfare of the subjects involved; the appropriateness of the methods used to
obtain informed consent; and the risks and potential medical benets of the investigation.162
This statement paved the way for the requirement of informed consent in studies by federally-funded insti-
tutions. Shortly after this initial statement, NIH's original 1953 Clinical Center policy was replaced with
an updated version, entitled Group Consideration and Informed Consent in Clinical Research.163 These
new guidelines demanded written consent by the subject and incorporated a variety of informed consent
requirements, including a detailed disclosure of the study and its risks, a list of procedures to be disclosed,
and an oral explanation that the subject could understand.164 With this document, informed consent nally
had some specic parameters within the research world. The elements that made up informed consent had
been nally highlighted, and \the Clinical Center document was the most careful and comprehensive state-
ment issued to this point on the subject of the ethics of research and its integral connection to problems of
informed consent."165
In May 1966, the Clinical Center guidelines were revised, in part because of criticism that the term \in-
formed consent" was unclear. The new document attempted to eliminate confusion by oering a further
explanation of informed consent. The new revision stated that a person must have the freedom to choose
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31and receive \a fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, their possible benets and attendant haz-
ards and discomforts, and the reasons for pursuing the research and its general objectives.166 To address
concerns, the policymakers chose to draft only minimal substantive prerequisites for how to obtain consent.
To compensate, they inserted a signicant procedural requirement that local review boards were to examine
local research facilities, to determine how to apply national standards to local research institutions.
The reliance on local review boards was an \attempt to achieve a uniform package of national standards while
permitting broad latitude and diversity at the local review level."167 Unfortunately, the intensity of local
review varied from location to location, causing concern that subjects were not in fact receiving adequate
disclosure and revealing that the US government would indeed need to institute a more thorough form of
review. However, the 1966 NIH policy merits careful consideration because it proved to be \the harbinger
of the current practice of Institutional Review Boards required by federal regulation."168
The two 1966 statements, themselves important, led to the publication of an even more signicant work:
the Institutional Guide to DHEW Policy on Protection of Human Subjects, published in 1971.169 Known as
the \Yellow Book," it contained specic guidelines about institutional review.170 \Informed consent" was
dened as \the agreement obtained from a subject, or from his authorized representative, to the subject's
participation in an activity."171 The Book listed six components of informed consent: a fair explanation of
the procedure; a disclosure of alternative procedures; a description of risks and discomforts; a description of
benets; an opportunity to ask questions about the procedure; and an instruction that the subject is free to
withdraw consent and terminate participation.172
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32With this system, DHEW had crafted a regulatory system whereby a review panel composed of both med-
ical and non-medical members monitored investigators to make sure that informed consent was obtained
and subjects were protected. Unlike some earlier eorts, DHEW's system included a specic denition of
informed consent and seemingly tightened the consent requirements to better protect subjects.
D.
Two Important Commissions
By the time DHEW's Yellow Book was published in the early 1970s, both the FDA regulations and NIH
guidelines had been reviewed and amended several times.173 Despite the eorts that had been made over
the last decade, however, US policymakers remained concerned about the lack of both adequate protections
for subjects and adequate consent provisions.174 Outrage over potential studies on human fetuses, as well as
the recent Tuskegee Experiment, generated much discussion within the Congress.175 In response, Congress
passed the National Research Act in 1974. The Act served two important purposes. First, it required DHEW
to adopt as federal regulation the NIH guidelines about protecting human research subjects.176 Second, it
created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search, whose purpose was to conduct a comprehensive investigation to identify the basic ethical principles
underlying research on humans and to recommend acceptable guidelines to DHEW, Congress and the Pres-
ident.177
The National Commission's mandate extended from 1974 to 1978, culminating in the 1979 Belmont Report.
The Commission based its discussion around what it perceived to be the three main ethical principles involv-
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33ing human research: respect for persons, benecence and justice.178 Each principle was then tied to a specic
policy guideline, with respect for persons applied to informed consent, benecence applied to risk/benet
assessment, and justice applied to the selection of subjects and the distribution of benets of research.179
Following this format, the Commission determined that the principle of respect for persons required some
form of consent, to protect individual's autonomy and personal dignity.180 The Commission assessed in-
formed consent in terms of three necessary conditions, namely information, comprehension and voluntari-
ness.181 The Report adopted the standard of the reasonable volunteer, proposing that the extent of disclosure
should be such that a reasonable volunteer could decide whether to participate.182
The Commission also placed great emphasis on institutional review boards (IRBs). The National Research
Act had ordered the Secretary to develop regulations dealing with the composition of these boards. In ad-
dition, the Commission sponsored a study at the University of Michigan to examine functioning IRBs. The
study revealed that most research institutions were happy with the local IRB system and felt that the IRB
system adequately protected subjects.183 Although these results led the Commission to support continued
expansion of the IRB system, the Michigan study also disclosed that the forms used for informed consent
needed to be more carefully modied. In response, the Commission put out a well-received separate report
on IRBs, discussing how to better craft the IRB system.184
After the National Commission's four-year term expired, a new group was formed to continue to study the
ethical issues surrounding research on humans. In 1978, Congress established the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.185 During its three-
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34year run, the President's Commission built on the work begun by the National Commission, with a special
mandate to report every two years on the adequacy of federal rules, and their implementation procedures,
for the protection of human subjects.186
While the President's Commission never really focused on informed consent in its reports, it did urge im-
plementation of many of the recommendations about informed consent that the National Commission had
advocated.187 The Commission did promote the adoption of a model of shared decision-making, in which
both patients and medical workers participated equally, but it failed to address adequately the potentially-
unequal relationship between physicians and patients.188 In general, however, the President's Commission
seemed to take a conservative approach to informed consent, declining to push for stricter protections for
human subjects.189
F. New Regulations
Both Commissions ultimately helped shape the new regulations issued by DHHS in 1981.190 The amended
regulations, which replaced those that had been issued in 1974, dealt with requirements for obtaining in-
formed consent, as well as the organization and functions of IRBs.191 The DHHS draft regulations initially
adopted the same regulatory framework for all types of research, rejecting a proposal to draft separate rules
for behavioral and social sciences and for biomedical sciences.192 Instead, the draft wanted to make certain
types of research (mostly behavioral and social research) either exempt or subject to expedited review.193
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35Behavioral and social scientists, however, balked at being regulated by the federal government.194
In the end, the 1981 regulations were applied only to research receiving federal funds. The main change
from the 1974 regulations was that research that posed little or no harm to subjects was now exempt from
institutional review.195 These new regulations wound up removing a layer of protection for subjects who
were participating in research that was either not federally-funded or presented little risk of danger; such
research included a great deal of behavioral and social science research. Although the government insisted
that these regulations oered merely a oor for protection of human subjects, with institutions free to impose
more stringent consent requirements if they chose, the regulations seem less strict than they could have been.
The government appeared to be shying from the drive to impose informed consent provisions in all possible
areas of research.
G. Current Policy
The enactment of 45 C.F.R. x46 in 1991 extended the scope of the 1981 DHHS regulations. In June 1991,
sixteen federal agencies, including the FDA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy,
adopted the DHHS regulations into their individual codes dealing with the protection of human subjects.196
The common Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects essentially governs all federally-sponsored
research, as well as commercially-sponsored research that is performed for pharmaceutical companies and
medical device manufacturers.197 The uniform standard requires that research be considered by an IRB; it
also lists guidelines for IRB organization and performance, including criteria for how to approve research.198
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36The common rule also includes a prolonged section detailing the general requirements for informed consent.
x46.116 requires that the information be provided in language understandable to the subject; without such
clear language, no consent (oral or written) will be considered informed.199 In addition, the Code denes
essential elements of informed consent. The eight basic elements are:
(1)
A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes of the research and the expected duration of the subject's participation, a description of the procedures to be followed, and identication of any procedures which are experimental;
(2)
A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject;
(3)
A description of any benets to the subject or to others which may reasonably be expected from the research;
(4)
A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject;
(5)
A statement describing the extent, if any, to which condentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained;
(6)
For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether any medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they consist of, or where further information may be obtained;
(7)
An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research and research subjects' right, and whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury to the subject; and
(8)
19945 C.F.R. x46.116.
37A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benets to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benets to which the subject is otherwise entitled.200
The same section also includes further additional factors that may be applicable to certain special subjects
at heightened risk, such as fetuses, pregnant women or prisoners.201 These highly specic requirements
clearly delineated the boundaries of informed consent. The code therefore worked hard to assure that all
subjects would receive protection against unfair research and adequate, understandable information about
the experiments in which they were involved.
45 C.F.R. x46 is still in eect. Today, the current regulations include three fundamental ways to protect re-
search subjects. First, DHHS' Oce for the Protection of Research Risks (OPRR) provides federal regulatory
oversight of research facilities. Second, federally-sanctioned IRBs grant studies internal approval. Finally,
human subjects give voluntary informed consent.202 Of these three, \the operative regulatory mechanism is
the requirement for authentic, uncoerced informed consent{the oversight of OPRR and the approval of an
IRB merely providing the government the opportunity to check compliance."203 Informed consent therefore
forms the backbone of current federal policy, signaling that the US government has nally formally acknowl-
edged the necessity of monitoring investigators and ensuring that human subjects receive the information
they need to give informed consent.
V. Conclusion
Although current regulations now oer human research subjects signicant protections, US policymakers
clearly struggled considerably while developing these informed consent provisions. The US strikingly lagged
behind other countries and international organizations in formulating such policies; note the twenty-year lag
period between the Nuremberg Code's promulgation in 1948 and the publication of several important US
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38policy statements in 1966. In addition, even though the early international codes were not legally binding,
the US seemed hesitant to support them. The US' reluctance seems particularly odd given that European
countries are often more lax than the US in their regulatory measures, often approving new medications
(such as RU-486) and procedures much earlier than the American FDA.
It is also surprising that US legislators took so long to act when American courts had long recognized the
importance of informed consent, as well as subjects' self-determination and autonomy. However, the Fortner
court's 1935 decision acknowledging the necessity for research on human subjects may help explain the
US government's delay in issuing informed consent regulations. Even though the Fortner case did impose
limits on experimentation on humans, US drafters could also point to the case as a justication for such
experimentation and as an early signal that investigators should be allowed discretion. This tendency to rely
on investigators' judgments appeared to govern American policy until the public outcry following consent
violations, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, forced legislators to step in and oer subjects greater
protections.
Interestingly, it was NIH, not FDA, that took the lead and worked particularly hard to make the informed
consent requirement meaningful for human subjects. Even though FDA was the regulatory body, FDA
administrators appeared to have trouble adequately dening and narrowing the informed consent provision.
NIH, on the other hand, was much more proactive in crafting specic parameters around informed consent,
in order to extend the applicability of the provision from experimental drugs and devices to research. Most
notably, NIH was responsible for introducing many of the major elements of informed consent, such as
demanding independent review by outside committees, detailed disclosure of the experiment and its risks,
and oral explanations that would be understandable by subjects. Surprisingly, these landmark events in our
regulatory history were initiated by the agency responsible for funding and conducting government research.
However, perhaps NIH's willingness to regulate comes precisely from the fact that it, unlike FDA, actually
39conducted experiments and thus witnessed rst-hand the dangers for human subjects in medical experiments.
The current regulations do oer signicant protections for human subjects. In addition, the recognition that
certain groups, such as children and prisoners, require special protections demonstrates that legislators are
indeed committed to overseeing research and ensuring that subjects are not exploited. As medical science
progresses, legislators may want to expand such protections; for example, with the boom in genetics studies,
they might want to impose additional limits on studies on human fetuses or pregnant women. The future
will require a continued application of an important balancing test: US government agencies will have to
remain vigilant about protecting subjects' rights, while still allowing crucial medical research to continue.
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